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Abstract.  A method for choosing equilibria in strategic form games is 
proposed and axiomatically characterized.  The method as well as the 
axioms are inspired by the Nash bargaining theory. The method can be 
applied to existing refinements of Nash equilibrium (e.g., perfect equi- 
librium)  and also  to other equilibrium  concepts,  like correlated  equi- 
librium. 
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1.  Introduction 
The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in strategic form games has been a 
problem  since  the  introduction  of the  concept  by Nash  (Ref.  1).  Many 
refinements of Nash  equilibria  have  since  then  been  proposed;  see  Van 
Damme  (Ref.  2)  for  a  survey.  Furthermore,  methods  of  equilibrium 
selection were developed by Harsanyi and Selten (Ref. 3) and also by G/ith 
and Kalkofen (Ref. 4).  As it refers to a  selection from a  correspondence, 
the expression "equilibrium selection" refers to methods that always lead to 
a unique equilibrium; see Giith and Kalkofen, Ref. 4, p.  13. This paper will 
be concerned with correspondences assigning to a  strategic form game a 
nonempty subset of the set of lotteries over all equilibria of a certain kind. 
Therefore, it deals with refinement of equilibrium, rather than selection. A 
correspondence as meant here will be called simply a  "solution." 
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Instead  of proposing  another  refinement of Nash  equilibrium,  the 
paper introduces a  general method of choosing equilibria from classes  of 
equilibria  associated  with  various  specifications  of the  admissible joint 
strategies  of the  players.  These specifications  may  lead  to  well-known 
concepts  like  Nash  equilibrium  or  correlated equilibrium  (cf.  Aumann, 
Refs. 5-6), but in principle also to other kinds of equilibrium, as long as 
the specification of the admissible joint strategies is symmetric with respect 
to  the players, closed within the set of probability distributions  over the 
players'  pure  action  combinations,  and  consistent  with  respect  to  sub- 
games.  Furthermore, the method may also  be  applied  to  refinements of 
equilibrium  sets  that  satisfy certain  minimal requirements.  Examples of 
Nash  equilibrium  refinements  are:  perfect  equilibrium  (Selten,  Ref.  7), 
proper equilibrium (Myerson, Ref.  8),  and persistent  equilibrium (Kalai 
and Samet, Ref. 9). The application to the set of perfect Nash equilibria is 
discussed in detail in Section 4. 
In order for the method to be applied to some equilibrium concept, in 
each game a so-called disagreement payoff vector has to be chosen. This is 
done by specifying a disagreement map, satisfying certain conditions. For 
instance, in an earlier version of this paper (Peters and Vrieze, Ref. 10), the 
method was developed for the class of Nash equilibria, with the vector of 
the players' maximin payoffs as disagreement vector. 
For a  given disagreement map and a  given equilibrium concept, the 
paper focuses on the solution assigning those lotteries between equilibria 
that maximize the product of the payoff gains of the players relative to 
their disagreement payoffs, and so clearly is inspired by the Nash bargain- 
ing solution (Nash, Ref. 11). This so-called Nash solution will be character- 
ized in  a  way that is  closely related to  the Nash characterization of the 
Nash bargaining solution. However, the axioms used relate to the strategic 
form game, in contrast with the approach in Harsanyi and Selten (Ref. 12, 
p.  98). 
It should be stressed that application of the method proposed in this 
paper  does  not  entail  that  the  noncooperative game  is  changed into  a 
cooperative one, nor that it is solved by cooperative principles. Rather, the 
presumption  is  that  an  equilibrium  can  be  self-enforcing and  that  the 
problem is not with the notion of equilibrium itself, but with the multiplic- 
ity of equilibria. Therefore in this paper, a cooperative part is added to the 
normal form game: the players agree (perhaps with binding force) on a 
method to guide them in their playing the game. However, the recommen- 
dation of this method is not binding, but nevertheless important, since it 
may serve as a focal point. Thus ultimately, the players still play the game 
noncooperatively, according to  the  specification of the  admissible joint 
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possible, then  there would be no need to consider only equilibria,  and  a 
method  like  the  Nash  solution  could  as  well  be  applied  to  the  whole 
cooperative payoff space. 
As stated, a  solution chooses lotteries between equilibria.  The reason 
for  modeling  a  solution  like  this  is partly  technical  (it  leads  to  convex 
payoff sets)  and  partly  intuitive.  Consider  for  instance  the  battle  of the 
sexes (see also Section 5), 
L  R 
BLO, O  1,  ' 
and  the  Nash  equilibrium.  The  Nash  solution  with  the  maximin  payoff 
vector  as  disagreement  vector  prescribes  each  of the  two  pure  Nash 
equilibria (T, L) and (B, R) with probability 1/2. This seems not only fair, 
but also helps the players in reaching expected payoffs that  Pareto-domi- 
nate the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium payoffs. The Pareto optimality 
property  seems  to  be  compelling  for  a  cooperative  recommendation 
method.  However, a method recommending both (T, L) and (B, R) would 
not be very helpful. In analogy with the well-known interpretation of mixed 
strategies  embodying the players  uncertainty  as  to  what  their  opponents 
will  do,  a  lottery  on  Nash  equilibria  can  be  interpreted  as  the  players 
uncertainty as to the final recommendation, rather than as a public lottery 
performed by some mediating  institution.  In  the case of correlated  equi- 
libria,  such a  lottery is again a  correlated equilibrium. 
The present paper  takes the belief that  an  equilibrium  or refinement 
can be self-enforcing as a  starting point and tries to present a general (i.e., 
applicable  to  a  whole class  of games)  method  to  select from  a  possible 
multiplicity  of  equilibria.  It  should  be  noted  that  Tedeschi  (Ref.  13) 
proposed  independently  a  refinement  for  correlated  equilibrium  that  is 
related to our method applied to the correlated equilibria case. 
The  organization  of the paper  is  as  follows.  Section 2  describes the 
basics of the model, and Section 3 introduces and discusses the axioms. In 
Section  4,  the  characterization  result  is  stated  and  proved.  Section  5 
concludes. 
2.  Basics of the Model 
For  a  nonempty  set  A,  oLa(A) denotes  its  lottery set,  i.e.,  the  set  of 
probability  distributions  on A  with  finite  support.  Let N  =  {1, 2 .....  n} 
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In  order  to  define  a  game  in  strategic  form,  we  first  introduce  the 
concept of a joint strategy specification for N. This is a  correspondence  T 
assigning,  to each n-tuple ($1 .....  Sn) of finite sets, a  subset of the lottery 
set  La( X  7=1S;)  and  satisfying conditions  (T1)-(T3)  below.  Elements  of 
T(Sa .....  Sn)  are  admissible joint strategies.  The  probability  assigned  by 
a~T(S1,...,  S,)  to  the  element  (sl .....  s~)  of  >(7=~S;  is  denoted  by 
a(sa, ￿9  s,).  The  set  S; is the  action  set of player  i,  i.e.,  the  set  of pure 
strategies  available  to player i. 
In what  follows, some notations  will be useful.  For 
s  =  (sa,  s2,  ￿9 ￿9 ￿9  s,)  e  >~  S,, 
i=1 
s-; denotes the vector obtained by deleting the ith component of s. The set 
S-; is defined similarly,  i.e., 
S-i,=  ￿  Sk. 
k~; 
The meaning  of other notations in this spirit,  like s -iJ,  S -;a, (s -i, s]), etc., 
should be clear. In particular,  (s -;J, v, w) has v and w as ith andjth entries, 
respectively. 
The conditions  on a joint strategy specification  T are as follows: 
(T1)  T(Sa .....  S,)  is a  closed subset of s  )<7=iS;); 
(T2)  T(Sa,...,  S,)  is  symmetric;  i.e.,  if  Si =S j,  then  for  all 
s~ ~ S;, ~ ~ S;,  and  a e T( Sa .....  S,),  there  exists  a 
~eT(Sa,...,  S,)  such  that  a(s -i':, gi, ~) =  ~(  s-iJ, ~, s;)  for 
every s-;JeS-i':; 
(T3)  T  is  consistent;  i.e.,  if S~ c  Si  for  every  i~N,  then  extending 
each o" e T(S'~ .....  S'~) to  X 7= ~  S;, by assigning the probability 
0  to action  combinations  not in  X  7=iS';,  gives an.element  of 
T(Sa .....  s,). 
Well-known  examples  of specifications  T(S1 .....  S,)  are,  with  some 
abuse of notation,  ~(  X  7= I S;),  X 7= 1L#(Si), and  X  7= aS;, i.e., the sets of 
correlated,  mixed,  and pure joint strategies,  respectively. 
A  strategic form game on N  has  the form 
Y' =  (S  ! .....  S,, T, K, .....  X, ), 
where  the  sets  S;  are  the  players'  action  sets,  T  is  a  joint  strategy 
specification, and K;: L?( X  7= ~  S;) --+ R is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
payoff function  of  player  i,  assigning  expected  pa3,offs  in  particular  to 
elements  a  of  T(S1 ....  , S,);  so,  the  functions  K;  are  supposed  to  be 
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Next, the concept of equilibrium will be defined. For that purpose, we 
need  some  notations.  For  a~T(S1,...  ,So),  i~N,  and  s~Si  such  that 
~( t-i, si) > 0 for some t-i~S -t,  let 
Y. 
t -i~S  -i 
be the marginal probability of s-~S  -i,  given s~. Let further 
#i(a) := {si eSf:3s -teS -i, with a(s -i, si) > O} 
be the support of a  for player i. When judging the quality of an action 8f, 
player i compares the associated expected payoff to  the expected payoff 
from a  switch to  a  different action st, conditionally on the other players 
playing according to a(. [ s~,.). Hence, player i compares the numbers 
K,(,r(.  Is3),s,)'. -  -  E  K,(s-',si)'Ks-'ls%),  si Si" 
s -ieS-i 
We are now in a  position  to  define the equilibrium concept. A  strategy 
a ~ T(SI .....  S,) is said to be an equilibrium if, for each player i and each 
Kg(g("  ]~i), 6) --Ki(a(" I~i), sg),  for each sieSi. 
It can be verified easily that  this  definition coincides with the idea of a 
correlated equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies, in 
the respective associated cases. 
From now on, the joint strategy specification T will he fixed.  ~v will 
denote the collection of all games with N players. E(F) will denote the set 
of equilibria of 1  v  . For 
r(s,,...,  s.)= 
i=l 
the nonemptiness of E(F) was already established by Nash (Ref. 1), while 
for 
the nonemptiness of E(F) is proved in Aumann (Ref. 4). 
In  general,  E(F)  contains  more  than  one  element,  and  different 
elements of E(F) give rise to different payoff vectors. In the next section, 
we present a procedure which will turn out to assign a unique payoff vector 
to each game. This solution procedure can not only. be applied directly to 
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In order to introduce this procedure, the concept of cyclic symmetry of 
a  game  needs  to  be  defined.  In  this  concept,  cyclic permutations  of the 
player  set  or  subsets  of the  player  set  play  a  role.  For  ~  r  L  c  N,  a 
permutation rc of N is called L-cyclic if n is N\L-invariant [i.e., n(i) =  i, for 
every i ~L] and the restriction of 7r to L  is cyclic of order [L I. Recall that 
this last property means that 
rclLI(i) =  i and L  =  {tel(i),..., ~ZlLI(i)},  for every ieL. 
Here, gk(i)  ----  ~Z  o  ￿9  ￿9  ￿9  o  n(i), n applied k  times. As an example, suppose that 
L  =  {1, 2, 3, 4}; then,  n  with rffl) =  2,  n(2) =  3,  u(3) =  4,  and  u(4) =  1 is 
an L-cyclic permutation. For ~  r  L  c  N  and an L-cyclic permutation rc of 




Si =  S s, for all  i,j e L; 
Kg(s) =K~k(;)(nk(s)),  for  every  ieN,  every  ssS1  x  " " " X  SN, 
and  every  k  =  1  .....  ]L I -  1,  where  (Tzk(s))j,=s(~k)_~(j),  for 
every j e N. 
Observe that cyclic symmetry is a weak kind of symmetry. Usually for 
r  L  c  N,  a  game  is  called  L-symmetric if (CS1)  is  satisfied  and,  for 
every N\L-invariant permutation n, it holds that 
Ki(s)  = K,(o(rffs)),  for all  i~N. 
Hence, an L-symmetric game in the usual sense is also ~r-cyclic symmetric; 
but except for ILl  =  1 and  ILl =  2,  the converse is not true. 
With  n  an L-cyclic permutation  of N,  a  subset  V  c  T(S1 .....  Sn)  is 
called re-cyclic symmetric if, for every a e V and k  =  1, 2 .....  ILl -  1,  also 
ak ~ V, where ak is defined by 
ak(nk(s)) ,=a(S),  for all seSi  x  ...  x  S,. 
Observe  that,  for  a  n-cyclic  symmetric  game  F,  also  E(F)  is  g-cyclic 
symmetric. 
A  game 
s  r  F' =  (S'1,...,  Sn, T, K, .....  K'  n) 
is a  subgame of F  if S'i c  Si and K'; is the restriction of K i to S~, for every 
ieN. 
Let D  be a  map which assigns  to every game a  vector in the payoff 
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(D1)  Di(F) __ Ki(a),  for all acE(V)  and ioN; 
(D2)  for all F, F'cC~ with F' a subgame of F for which, for all icN 
and  for  all  soS'ix'"  xS'i_ixSi\S~xS~+lX...xS',  it 
holds that K~(s) = Di(F'),  we have D(F) = D(F'); 
(D3)  if F  is n-cyclic symmetric for an L-cyclic permutation  n,  then 
Di(F) = Dj(F) for all i, jcL. 
D  is called a  disagreement map,  and D(F) is called a  disagreement point. 
An  example  of  D  in  the  Nash-equilibria  case  [the  case  where 
T(S1 .....  S.) ~  X  7=1~(S~)] is the value vector defined by 
v/(F) --  min  max Ki(tr -i, si). 
ff --iE Xj #i~(Si)  8iES  i 
Evidently, being the payoff that player i can guarantee for himself, v~ (F) is 
less than or equal to Ki(a  ) for all acE(F), while properties (D2) and (D3) 
can easily be checked to hold for v. 
For a  given  disagreement  map  D,  a  solution  is  a  correspondence 
assigning to each Fcf#  N a nonempty subset of Aa(E(F)), the set of lotteries 
on E(F). If player i has payoff function Ki, then Ki(/0 denotes i's expected 
payoff from the lottery #eA~ 
The  Nash  solution  E  is  defined as  follows.  For every Fs~ N,  define 
N(F) by 
N(F),={icN:  Ki(a  ) > Di(F),  for some acE(F)}. 
Then,  if N(F) #  lZ/, for  every kicLa(E(F)),  let  /icE(F)  if and  only if ki 
maximizes the product [li~N(r)[Kg (#) --Dg (F)], over all # c Aa(E(F)). Other- 
wise, if N(F) = ffS, for every/i c~(E(F)),  let/i ~E(F) if and only if 
K(~) ,= [K, (~) ....  , K. (~)]  =  D(r). 
Observe  the  similarity  between  this  definition  and  the  definition  of the 
Nash bargaining  solution; cf. Nash (Ref.  11). 
3.  Axioms 
This section is concerned with the formulation  and discussion of the 
axioms  that  will  be  used  in  the  characterization  of the  Nash  solution. 
Throughout,  a fixed joint strategy specification T and disagreement map D 
will be assumed. Let ￿9  be a  solution. 
(A1)  Pareto  Optimality.  For  all  F~f#  N,  p~O(F),  vcL~(E(F)),  if 
K(v) >_ K(#), then K(v) = K(p). 362  JOTA: VOL.  83, NO.  2,  NOVEMBER  1994 
Note that Pareto optimality is required with respect to ~(E(F)); as is 
well known, equilibria that are efficient with respect to the total strategy 
space may fail to exist. 
(A2)  Payoff  Representation  Invariance. For  all  Fe(#  N  and  all 
a, b ~ R", with a  strictly positive, 
O(F) = (I)(a  F + b), 
with 
aF +b .'=(S  l .... , Sn, T, aiK1 +bl,...,  a,,K,, +b,,). 
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff functions Ki are unique only 
up to positive affine transformations. This fact is reflected by the payoff 
representation  invariance  axiom.  Alternatively,  applying  positive  affine 
transformations  to  the  payoffs  in  a  game  does  not  affect  the  players 
strategic possibilities. 
(A3)  Payoff Completeness.  For all  F~(~  N, #~tI)(F),  veLP(E(F)), if 
K(v) = K(#), then v~O(F). 
Payoff completeness requires a  solution not to  discriminate between 
lotteries of equilibria with the same expected payoffs. 
(A4)  Cyclic Symmetry. For every F~f#  N and L-cyclic permutation 
~, if F is n-cyclic symmetric, then K;(#) = Kj (#), for all # ~tI)(F) 
and all i, j ~L. 
If F is n-cyclic symmetric, then there is no apparent way to distinguish 
between the players in  L,  and  so  the  solution should not make such  a 
distinction.  Observe  that,  if  ￿9  happens  to  be  payoff  unique  [i.e., 
K(#) = K(v) for all #, v~O(F)], then cyclic symmetry would be implied by 
the standard anonymity property. 
The final axiom is given below. 
(A5)  Multilateral  Reduction  Independence. Consider  all  games 
F, F'E~  N such that: 
(M1)  F' = (S'I .....  S', T, K~ .....  K')  is a  subgame of 
F=(S,  .... ,S~, T, K1,...,K~); 
(M2)  D(F') = D(F); 
(M3)  for all ieN  and for all 
t  t  t  r  seS'~  x  ...  x  Si-1  x  Si\Si  x  St+.~ x  .."  x  Sn, 
K,(s) _ z),(r). 
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In words: Assume that a game F' arises from a game F by reducing the 
strategy sets in such a way that (i) the disagreement point does not change 
and that  (ii)  for any player, deviating to  a  strategy only feasible in  the 
larger game yields him at most his disagreement payoff if all other players 
stick to their strategies in the reduced sets. Then, the solution in the smaller 
game F' should be a subset of the solution in the original game F, provided 
this is feasible. 
Note that condition (M3) describes a Nash equilibrium-like situation 
with respect to omitting strategies. One can imagine a  bargaining process 
resulting in each player promising not to use certain of his strategies. If the 
conditions of multilateral reduction independence are fulfilled,  then these 
promises are self-enforcing. 
Also note that, by (T3), (D1), (M2), (M3), 
E(F') c  E(F).  (I) 
A stronger version of the multilateral reduction independence axiom can be 
obtained by replacing (M3) by (1). This version could also be used in the 
characterization result in the next section. However, condition (M3) has a 
more intuitive strategic interpretation, which we prefer. Consistently with 
what we wrote in Section 1, we view the solution tI) as a recommendation 
method on which the players have reached an agreement, possibly after 
having discussed its characterizing properties. In particular, they may agree 
on a property like multilateral reduction independence on the basis of the 
given strategic interpretation. 
The multilateral reduction independence axiom is  clearly related  to 
Nash's  independence  of irrelevant  alternatives  (Nash,  Ref.  11)  and  to 
Aumann's version of that axiom for correspondences (Aumann, Ref.  14). 
It  is  formulated in  terms  of the underlying strategic  game, contrary to 
Axiom 6 in Harsanyi and Selten (Ref.  12, p.  99). 
Of the axioms proposed, the only one that does not have an immediate 
equivalent in  the Nash  (Ref.  11)  original  formulation is  that  of payoff 
completeness. This is not surprising, since the Nash bargaining problem is 
modeled in the utility space (i.e., payoff space), and an underlying set of 
alternatives does not play an explicit role. 
4.  Characterization  of the Nash Solution 
As before, f9  N is the class of games on N for some fixed pair T, D. The 
characterization theorem of the Nash solution is given below. 
Theorem 4.1.  A  solution ￿9  on  ~N satisfies  Pareto optimality, pay- 
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multilateral reduction independence if and only if ￿9  is the Nash solution 
Y~. 
In the following lemma the "if" part of Theorem 4.1  is checked. 
Lemma 4.1.  The Nash solution E  satisfies the five axioms mentioned 
in Theorem 4.1. 
Proof.  Pareto  optimality,  payoff  representation  invariance,  and 
payoff completeness  of the  Nash  solution  E  are  straightforward.  Cyclic 
symmetry of E  follows  from  the  fact  that  E(F)  is  re-cyclic  symmetric 
whenever F  has this property, payoff uniqueness of E [i.e., K(p) = K(v) for 
all  /~, v~Y.(F)]  and  anonymity of E  [i.e.,  the  vector K(#)  permutes  with 
every permutation of the player set, for every/~eE(F)]. 
Finally, multilateral reduction independence of E follows with the aid 
of (1).  [] 
The proof of the "only if" part will be based on a  cyclic symmetriza- 
tion  method,  which  in  the  two-person  case  is  closely related  to  a  sym- 
metrization method introduced by Griesmer et al. (Ref.  15). To 
F =  (S, .....  S,, T, KI,...,  K, ), 
we associate the game 
F=(S  .....  S, T,K'I .....  g,) 
in the following way: 
(i)  S=Slk.)S2k.)'''t,.JSn  . 
The original action sets are supposed to be disjoint. 
(ii)  Let rE be the shift-permutation 
n(1) =  2,  n(2) =  3,...,  n(n -  1) = n,  re(n) =  1. 
If g=(Sl .....  g,)~S  x...  x S  and  there  is  a  k~{1,2 .....  n} 
such that 
Yi~Snk(i),  for each ieN, 
then 
/~i(gl .....  gn) '=K~k~0(zck(s-)),  for each iEN. 
Note that TCk(S) was defined in Section 2;  see condition (CS2). 
(iii)  If g = (g~,..., g,) ~S x  ￿9 ￿9 ￿9 ￿  S and a k  as in (ii) does not exist, 
then 
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Observe that  (ii) above applies  to g if and  only if 
s  .....  Sn, Sl,...  ,Sk),  for some ke{1,2 .....  n}, 
with 
si ~Si,  for each  i~N. 
In  that  case, 
gi(Sk  +  l  ,  Sk_r  2  ,  ￿9  .  ￿9  ,  Sn,  S 1 .....  Sk) =  Ki+k(mod,)(S 1  , S  2  .....  Sn). 
It can easily be checked that  the game  F  is n-cyclic symmetric. 
Recall  that  the  map  T  is  defined  for  all  n-tuples  of finite  sets,  in 
particular  also for (S  .....  S) as above. 
For the two-person case, a game F  written as a bimatrix [/(1, K2] gives 
as cyclic symmetrization  the game  r" defined  as 
[  /~1(F)'/~2(F)  K''K2  1 
K[, K~  /31(F ),/)2(F)  ' 
where/)k(F)  denotes  a  square  matrix  of appropriate  size with  each entry 
equal  to Dk(F)  and  the superscript  t  denotes the transposed  matrix. 
In the three-person  case, the cyclic symmetrization  of a  game F  leads 
to 
pl.2  pl.2  pl.2 
pl.1 
where the first block row of each matrix  corresponds  to actions  of player 
1 from $1, the second one to actions from $2, and the third  one to actions 
from $3. The three-block columns correspond in a similar way to $1, $2, $3 
for  player  2.  Observe  that  the  first  matrix  is  [SI[  layers  deep,  each  one 
corresponding  with  a  certain  action  of player 3 in  1  ~ from  $1. Analogous 
structures  hold  for  the  second  and  third  matrix.  Each  dot  consists  of a 
block of appropriate size with each element equal to [D~ (F), D2(F), D3(F)]. 
Similarly  as  above,  cyclic symmetrization  can  be defined  for  subsets 
L  ~  N,  for instance  for L  =  { 1, 2 .....  l}, 
r=  (  ,~,  S,+ l .....  s,,  r, l~l, . . . , g,), 
/ times 
with  S  =  U~= 1Sk  and  g'i,  i =  1, 2,...,  n,  defined  analogously  as  above, 
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In the sequel, we need some additional  notation.  Let # e T(S .....  S) 
in F, and let ~  be a  permutation  of N.  Define the number 
an(g~t(l ) .....  S~(n)) t=  ~  ...  E  IT(S1 ....  , Sn), 
Sl eSn(1)  gnaSh(n) 
i.e., as the total probability mass assigned by t~ to the subgame in i  ~ arising 
from the permutation  re. If this number is positive, define the joint strategy 
t/~ e T(S~o),...,  S~(~)) in the game (S~o) .....  S~(,), T, Kin) ....  , K~(~) )  by 
~.(s, ....  , s.) ,= o(s, .....  s.) lO=( s. m  .....  &.)). 
The next lemma paves the way for the proof of the "only if" part of 
Theorem 4.1.  It states that an equilibrium  in F  induces equilibria  in the n 
subgames 
7ok(F) .'= <Sk+, .....  S,,, S, .....  Sk, T, Kk + , .....  K,, K, .....  K, ). 
Lemma  4.2.  Let  F  and  P  be  as  above,  with  additionally 
De(F) =  D:(F),  for all i,j~N.  Let rr be the  shift permutation.  Then: 
(i)  F  is 7r-cyclic symmetric; 
(ii)  D(F) = D(F); 
(iii)  forevery t/eE(F), ifa,,(S~k(1) ..... S~k(~)) >0, then  0~keE(rtk(F)). 
Proof. 
(i)  This is obvious from the definition  of F. 
(ii)  Consider  the  subgame  ($1, $2 .....  Sn, T, K1,...,  K, )  of  F, 
which is identical to the original  game F. By definition of F, we have that, 
for each (Sl .....  gn)~S1  x  ...  ￿  Si_l  x  S\Si  x  Si+l  x  ...  ￿  S~, 
gi(sl .....  sn) =  D,(F), 
Hence, property  (D2)  of D  implies D(F) =  D(F). 
(iii)  Let 6EE(r'),  and let 6=k(&+~ .....  S~, S~ ....  , Sk) >0 for some 
ke{1, 2 .....  n}. Let for player i -  k(mod n), s~ ~&, with st e#i-ktmod ~)(0). 
Then,  by definition  of equilibrium, 
&(O(~), ~) >  R/(O(~), s~),  for all s, e&. 
Observe that 
_~i(O(~i), si )  =  ~  _~z(  s-i, si)O(s-il si)"  ~  a( t-i, si) 
S -i~s -i  t -Ti~S -i 
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= K,(~dsS).  s,)"  Z  ~(t-  -~, s,A ) 
t -ieS  -i 
On the right-hand  side of this  equality,  only the first term  depends  on s~. 
Hence from 
--  --  ^  A  --  -  ^  K, (a(si), s,) >_ Ki (,T(si), s~), 
we can conclude  that 
K,O~(s.).  s~.) >_ Ki(~k(g~ ). s,). 
which yields o-,keE(nk(F)).  [] 
It should be noted that part (iii) of Lemma 4.2 for n =  2 is related to 
parts  (iii)  and (iv) of Theorem  4.1  in Jansen  et al.  (Ref.  16). 
Next,  the  "only if" part  of Theorem  4.1  can be proved. 
Lemma  4.3.  Let  the  solution  (I) on  f#N satisfy the  five axioms  men- 
tioned in Theorem  4.1.  Then,  q) equals  the Nash  solution Z. 
Proof.  Let  F~ff~  and  let N(F)  be as in  the  definition  of the Nash 
solution.  If N(F) =  ~,  then 
SO 
{K(/~): # ￿9  2~~  } = {D(F)  }, 
~(I-) c  x(r)  =  ~(E(r)). 
From  this  and  the payoff completeness  of q), 
*(r)  =  X(r). 
If IN(F)[ =  1,  then  ~(F)  =  Z(F)  follows straightforwardly  by Pareto 
optimality  and payoff completeness.  From now on,  let 
N(F) =  {1 .....  l},  with  l > 2. 
In view of the payoff representation  invariance,  it is w.l.o.g,  to assume 
D(r) =(0,...,0) 
and 
Y~(F) =  {/~ e&f(E(r)): Ki(/~) =  1, 1 <_i<l; Ki(#) =0, l+ 1 <iNn}. 368  JOTA: VOL. 83, NO. 2, NOVEMBER 1994 
The definition of the Nash solution then implies that, for all # e La(E(F)), 
K(#) ~conv({le;: 1 _< i < l} u  {(0 .....  0)}),  (2) 
where e * is the ith unit vector in R  n. 
Let P be the n-cyclic symmetric game associated with F, where n is the 
N( F) -cyclic shift permutation, as defined above. Let tr ~E(F). Then, a  can 
be extended to P in the obvious way by assigning probability 0 to the added 
action combinations. So, E(F) c  E(P).  Let #~E(P).  Then by Lemma 4.2 
applied to F  and P, we obtain [recall that D(F) = 0] 
l 




2k>0  and  Y,  2ke[0,1]. 
k=l 
Since for each k  =  1  ....  , l we have 
[K=k(1)(ff=k)  ....  , K=k(n)(ff,  k)l ~conv({/eq 1 < i _< l} to {(0, 0 .....  0)}), 
by (2), it follows that 
R(ff)~conv(  {lei: 1 < i < l} va {(0, 0 .....  0)}). 
Therefore, 
{K(ff): 6 ~E(F)} = conv({lei:  1 <_ i < l} u  {(0, 0,...,  0)}). 
P  is n-cyclic symmetric, so for all tr sO(P)  we have 
Ki(tr)  = Kj(tr),  i,j~{1 .....  1}, 
By Pareto optimality, we then have a e e#(p)  only if 
Ki(tr )  = Kj(tr) =  1,  for all i,j~{1 ....  ,1}, 
since there exists a  a~Za(E(F)) c  5r  with 
K~ (tr) =  1,  1 <  i </, 
Ki(a)  = 0,  otherwise. 
Therefore, by payoff completeness, we have 
O(P) =  {tr eZP(E(P)): Ke(a)  =  1, i <  1 < l; K~(tr) = 0,  otherwise}. 
In the formulation of the multilateral reduction independence axiom, 
the roles  of F, F', S] .....  S', can be  played by F, F, $1 .....  S,,  respec- 
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hence, 
by this axiom. Again using the payoff completeness axiom, this implies that 
O(F) =  {o'~(E(F)): Ki(o-  ) =  1, 1 < i < l; Ki(a  ) = 0, otherwise}. 
Therefore, 
O(r) = z(r).  [] 
Evidently, Theorem 4.1  follows from Lemmas 4.1  and 4.3. 
The  Nash  proof  of  the  characterization  of  the  Nash  bargaining 
solution uses a triangular bargaining problem [e.g.,  as in (2)] as a symmet- 
ric  superset  of the  given  bargaining  problem,  to  which  in  particular  the 
bargaining  axioms  of Pareto  optimality,  symmetry, and  independence  of 
irrelevant  alternatives  can be applied.  In the proof of Theorem 4.1,  more 
specifically of Lemma 4.3,  the image of Aa(E(F)) in payoff space is rotated 
with  respect  to  the  straight  line  xl =x2 .....  xn,  and  the  union  is 
taken. This leads to the cyclic-symmetric image of Aa(E(F)). This approach 
could be applied to the Nash original characterization as well; however, the 
converse is  not  apparent,  because it  is  not  clear  how,  for a  given  game 
F',  a  related  game  F  (larger  in  the  sense formulated  in  the  multilateral 
reduction  independence  axiom)  can  be constructed  that  has  a  triangular 
image in payoff space. 
Next, we show that Theorem 4.1 is tight in the sense that none of the 
five axioms can be dispensed with. For each of the axioms, we will describe 
a  solution violating that  axiom while satisfying the four other axioms. 
(i)  Pareto  Optimality.  Let  (I)(F):={#~Ae(E(F)): K(/0 =D(F)},  if 
this set is nonempty; let ~( F) ..= Y.( F), otherwise. 
(ii)  Payoff Representation Invariance.  Let ￿9  assign to F  the set of 
all elements in :T(E(F)) with lexicographically maximal payoffs. 
(iii)  Payoff Completeness.  Let O(F) .-= Y(F), if Z(F) c~ E(F) =  ~; let 
￿9 (F) .-= Z(F) c~ E(F), otherwise. 
(iv)  Cyclic Symmetry.  Let ￿9  assign  to  F  the set of all elements  of 
5e(E(F)) that maximize successively the payoffs to the players in 
some given order. 
(v)  Multilateral  Reduction Independence.  Let n = 2 and 
u(r),=[max  K,(a), max K2(a)l. 
L~E(F)  ~e~(r) 
Let  ￿9  assign  to  F  the  set  of all  members  of Aa(E(F))  that 
maximize  the  players'  payoffs  restricted  to  the  line  segment 
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The proofs of these statements are left to the reader. In particular,  to 
check the multilateral  reduction independence,  it is usually convenient to 
use inclusion (1). 
Finally, we substantiate our claim, made in the introduction, that our 
method  and in particular  Theorem 4.1  may be applied to  refinements  of 
Nash equilibrium,  by showing this  for perfect equilibria  (Selten,  Ref.  7). 
Thus, let PE(F) denote the set of perfect Nash equilibria in a game F. This 
set  is  n-cyclic  symmetric whenever  F  is.  In  (D1),  in  the  definition  of a 
solution and in particular of the Nash solution, and in the definitions of the 
axioms, replace E(10 by PE(F). In the definition of multilateral reduction 
independence,  replace  (M3) by the condition  PE(F') c  PE(F).  It can  be 
chekced, but is not completely trivial,  that with these modifications Lem- 
mas  4.1,  4.2,  and  4.3  still  hold  true,  with  E(r)  replaced  by PE(r') and 
E(z*(F)) by eE(nk(F)) in Lemma 4.2, and with E(F) and E(F) replaced by 
PE(F) and PE(F), respectively, in Lemma 4.3.  Consequently, Theorem 4.1 
presents a  characterization  for the case of perfect Nash equilibria as well. 
See also Example  5.4 in the next section. 
5.  Conclusions 
In this  paper,  we have introduced  and  axiomatically characterized  a 
general  method  of equilibrium  refinement.  The  adjective "general"  refers 
here  to  the  fact that  the method  may be applied  to  several equilibrium 
concepts and refinements thereof and to a  whole class of games. Since in 
many  games,  existing  refinements  do  not  lead  to  unique  equilibria,  the 
method  described may well  serve as  an  aid  to  arrive  at  a  unique  equi- 
librium,  at least at unique equilibrium payoffs. 
The paper will be concluded by some examples. 
Example 5.1.  If the set 
K,= {K(#) = (/(1  (#)  .....  K,(/x)):  # ~ Aa(E(F)) } 
has a unique Pareto optimal point, then the Nash solution consists of those 
# ~Aa(E(F)) which yield this point as payoff outcome. If in particular, E is 
the  set  of  all  Nash  equilibria  and  a  certain  equilibrium  point  payoff 
dominates all other equilibria, then this equilibrium point will be assigned 
by the Nash solution. 
Example 5.2.  A  generic 2 x 2 bimatrix  game possesses 1 or 3 equi- 
librium points.  In the latter case, two of these are pure and diagonal-wise 
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al ~  a2) 
(Vl, V2) 
Payoff to player 1 
Fig.  1.  Description of Example 5.2. 
al, a2  bl, b21 
cl,c2  dl, d2 
be a generic bimatrix game with three equilibria. Without loss of generality, 
assume  that  the  two  pure  equilibria  are  on  the  same  diagonal,  with 
equilibrium  payoffs (al, a2)  and  (dl, d2).  It  is  well  known  that  the  equi- 
librium  payoffs  of the  mixed  equilibrium  equal  (vl, v2),  where  vi  is  the 
maximin  value of player i,  so 
/)l ----"  (al dl -  b! c I )/(a 1 +  dl -  bl -  el), 
v2 =  (a2d2 -  b2c2)/(a2 +  d2 -  b2 -  c2). 
Suppose that  the Nash  solution is applied to the set of Nash equilibria  E, 
and let D  assign  the individual  maxmin  values. With 
2  =  (d~  -  vOl2(dl  -  a~)  -  (d2 -  v2)/2(a2  -  d2), 
it can  be checked that  the Nash  solution payoffs equal  (x 1  , x2), where 
(i)  (Xl, x2) =  (al, a2),  if 2 ___ I, 
(ii)  (xl, x2) =  (dl, d2), if 2 <  0, 
(iii)  (x~, x2) =  2(a,, a2) +  (1 -  2)(d~, d2), if 0 <  2 _< 1 (see Fig.  1). 
Notice that case (iii) corresponds to the correlated equilibrium where with 
probability  2  both  players  choose  their  first  action  and  with  probability 
1 -2  both players choose their  second  action.  Applying this  result to the 
battle of the sexes, 
2,1  0,0] 
0,0  1,2J' 
it  follows that  the  Nash  solution  corresponds  to  plating  cell  (2, 1)  with 
probability  1/2 and cell (1, 2) with probability  1  [2. 372  JOTA: VOL. 83, NO. 2, NOVEMBER 1994 
Example 5.3.  Let E  be the  set  of Nash  equilibria.  It  can  easily be 
checked that  any extreme point of 
K =  {K(#) = (Kl(kt),... , K,(#)):/z 6Aa(E(F))} 
can  be associated with  an  extreme point  of a  maximal  Nash  subset;  see 
Nash (Ref.  1) or Heuer and Millham (Ref.  17). Hence, the Nash solution 
can  always  be  written  as  a  possibly nonunique  convex  combination  of 
extreme points of maximal Nash subsets. 
Example 5.4.  Consider the bimatrix game 
L  R 
M  0,0  0,21. 
B  7,0  5, 
Let the disagreement point be given by the individual maxmin values, i.e., 
the  point  (5, 0).  Applying  the  Nash  solution for the  case of Nash  equi- 
librium,  we  obtain  the  outcome  (6.5, 0.5),  which  is  reached  by playing 
(T, L)  and  (B, R)  each  with  probability  1/2.  If we  restrict  attention  to 
perfect Nash equilibria, the Nash solution prescribes (T, L) with probabil- 
ity 1. By deleting the second row of player 1, so that the game becomes 
L  R 
B  7,0  5,  ' 
the Nash solution is not affected if lotteries between all Nash equilibria are 
considered.  However,  the  pair  (T, L)  is  no  longer  perfect,  and  when 
restricted  to perfect Nash equilibria,  the Nash  solution prescribes (T, R), 
the  sole remaining  perfect Nash  equilibrium.  Observe that  this  does not 
violate the multilateral  reduction independence axiom. 
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